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SUGGESTED TITLE: Consequentiality and Contingent Values: An Emerging Paradigm 
 
 
 
 
In recent years a new paradigm has emerged with respect to the concept of “Hypothetical Bias” 
in contingent valuation.  Following Bohm’s (1972) seminal public goods experiments, empirical 
criterion validity tests of contingent valuation have sought to compare hypothetical (“stated”) 
survey responses against the criterion of actual (“revealed”) economic commitments to public 
goods: “Hypothetical bias is said to exist when values that are elicited in a hypothetical context, 
such as a survey, differ from those elicited in a real context, such as a market” (Harrison and 
Ruström, 2008, p. 752).  Whereas occasional research has found that hypothetical, stated values 
can be lower than actual commitments, reviews of hypothetical versus actual public goods 
contributions (e.g., Murphy and Stevens, 2004; Harrison and Ruström) and meta-analyses of 
these data suggest “that people tend to overstate their actual willingness to pay in hypothetical 
situations” (List and Gallet, 2001, p. 241; see also Little and Berrens, 2004 and Murphy et al., 
2005).  These conclusions translate into what appears to be the conventional wisdom regarding 
contingent valuation (CV): “A fundamental concern of any CV study is hypothetical bias.  
Respondents have a well-established tendency to state willingness to pay values that are 
significantly greater than those revealed in real-market interactions” (Aadland et al., 2007). 
 In a series of conference presentations, working papers, and a journal article, Richard 
Carson and Theodore Groves and co-authors (e.g. Carson and Groves et al., 1997, 1999, and 
2007) present an alternative paradigm for conceptualizing the relationship between stated 
preference survey responses and real economic commitments to private and public goods. To 
paraphrase Kuhn (1970, p. 81), in his influential treatise, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
these authors have looked at the same stated preference data, but placed them in a new set of 
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relations with one another by giving them a different framework.  Specifically, they argue that 
the bifurcation of data into purely hypothetical responses and real actions is misplaced and 
uninformative from an economic perspective.  Whereas psychologists have developed theories of 
hypothetical responses (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982), “economic theory has nothing to say 
about…purely hypothetical questions” (Carson et al., 2004).  Building on the mechanism design 
literature, economic theory does, however, offer a predictive, theoretical framework for 
interpreting responses that have the potential to influence agency action.    
 In this chapter, we summarize the theoretical arguments of Carson and Groves, et al., and 
assemble early empirical evidence that comports with this theoretical framework.  In doing so, 
we argue that redefining criterion validity in terms of consequentiality offers the potential for a 
fundamental paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense. That this shift has yet to be fully incorporated 
into the contingent valuation literature reflects the nascent state of this paradigmatic challenge as 
well as the continued inertia of the dominant hypothetical bias paradigm.  Further, empirical 
support for Carson and Groves, et al.’s consequentiality arguments have emerged in a somewhat 
piecemeal manner, spread across a diverse set of journal articles and unpublished manuscripts,  
 
Consequentiality: Conceptual Framework 
In this section we liberally draw from two sets of papers that lay the conceptual foundations of 
the consequentiality framework to criterion validity in contingent valuations (Carson and Groves 
et al. 1997, 1999, 2007; and Carson et al., 2004). The critical component of these is captured in 
the following comparative definitions. 
“Consequential survey questions: If a survey’s results are seen by the agent as 
potentially influencing an agency’s actions and the agent cares about the 
outcomes of those actions, the agent should treat the survey questions as an 
opportunity to influence those actions. In such a case, standard economic theory 
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applies and the response to the question should be interpretable using mechanism 
design theory concerning incentive structures. 
 
Inconsequential survey questions: If a survey’s results are not seen as having 
any influence on an agency’s actions or the agent is indifferent to all possible 
outcomes of the agency’s actions, then all possible responses by the agent will be 
perceived as having the same influence on the agent’s welfare. In such a case, 
economic theory makes no predictions.” (Carson and Groves, p. 183) 
 
The authors argue that in responding to a consequential survey question “a rational economic 
agent will take the incentive structure of a consequential survey into account in conjunction with 
information provided in the survey and beliefs about how that information is likely to be used” 
(Carson and Groves, p. 204).  Cover letters accompanying surveys typically stress that 
everyone’s response matters, in part to maximize response rates. Survey instruments generally 
suggest that responses will inform the policy process, and increase realism by, for example, 
providing reminders of substitute goods and budget constraints. This does not imply that 
respondents to a consequential survey, however, will necessarily reveal their true preferences.  
Indeed they may respond strategically if the question format is not incentive compatible, e.g. if it 
is an open-ended format. Also, even with an incentive-compatible elicitation, if respondent 
beliefs about the proposed outcome or its cost upon implementation differ from what is stated in 
the survey, the analyst will not be able to recover the respondent’s true preferences without 
knowledge of these beliefs. In this case, at least theoretically, the elicitation yields a truthful 
response but to a different proposal. 
 
Foundations: Incentive Compatibility and Demand Revelation of Binary Referendum Questions 
The incentive structure used in a survey question is therefore critical to the theoretical 
formulation and empirical evaluation of consequentiality.  When moving from theoretical 
conceptualizations to empirical explorations, it is useful to distinguish between the theoretical 
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notion of incentive compatibility and the empirical notion of demand revelation.  In many 
presentations these concepts have been used interchangeably (e.g. Cummings et al., 1995; Taylor 
et al., 2001) with the lack of clarity being a source of confusion.  Here we are explicit in our 
terms. An incentive-compatible mechanism is a theoretical concept, meaning that a respondent 
has an incentive to truthfully reveal his preferences. Demand revelation is an empirical concept, 
providing a measure of how well decisions correspond with true, underlying values.  If other 
conditions are not satisfied, it is possible that a theoretically incentive-compatible mechanism is 
not demand revealing, and vice versa. 
 Building upon mechanism design theory, most specifically what is referred to as the 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), Carson et al. (2004) argue 
that binary referenda can be incentive compatible under the following conditions. 
“Proposition 1: A binding (binary) referendum vote with a plurality aggregation rule is 
incentive compatible in the sense that truthful preference revelation is the dominant 
strategy when the following additional conditions hold: (a) the vote is coercive in that 
all members of the population will be forced to follow the conditions of the referendum 
if the requisite plurality favors its passage and (b) the vote on the referendum does not 
influence any other offer [that] might be made available to the relevant population.”  
 
Four recent studies (Taylor et al.; Vossler and McKee, 2006; Burton et al. 2007; Collins and 
Vossler, 2009)1 have used induced value laboratory experiments to explore the demand 
revelation characteristics of referenda that correspond with Carson et al.’s (2004) Proposition 1.  
Following Smith (1976), assuming that individuals abide by the postulate of non-satiation and 
are otherwise rational, experimental preferences can be achieved in a controlled economic 
laboratory setting by using a reward structure to induce prescribed monetary value on actions.  
                                                            
1 In the analysis that follows, we use data from Vossler and McKee’s dichotomous choice “real, certainty” 
treatment, Burton et al.’s “consequential” treatment for the three experiments they report on, and the dichotomous 
choice “plurality” treatment data from Collins and Vossler.  
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The basic idea is that given the opportunity to choose between two alternatives, “identical except 
that the first yields more of the reward medium (usually currency) than the second, the first will 
always be chosen (preferred) over the second.” (Smith (1976), p. 275).  Building on this idea, the 
common framework for exploring demand revelation in these experiments is that individuals are 
offered the opportunity to vote for a public good that will be provided to all individuals in the 
group if a specified voting threshold is surpassed. The public good has value in the sense that it 
provides personal monetary rewards to each individual i in the group.  If the provision rule is met 
individuals have to pay a specified cost, Ci, for its provision and each individual receive his or 
her induced value, Vi.2 If the voting threshold is not achieved, no one receives any payment and 
no one incurs any cost: the public good is not provided.  As an example, Taylor et al. replicate 
the Carson et al. (2004) Proposition 1 conditions in a secret ballot, majority rule referendum 
which they describe as follows: 
“If it passed, each subject in the room would pay $5 (regardless of whether they voted 
yes or no) and in return, they received ‘the good’, which was simply the amount of 
money that would be paid to them at the end of the experiment.  If it did not pass, no 
one paid $5 and no one received the good, regardless of how they voted…They were 
instructed to vote ‘yes’ if they would like the referendum to pass, and ‘no’ if they did 
not want the referendum to pass.”  (p. 63) 
  
Participants were informed of their personal induced value and told that not everyone had 
the same value.  They were not however informed of the range of values or how the values 
were distributed across other participants.  
In the Taylor et al. experiment, the personal induced value of the good varied across 
participants, while all individuals paid the same cost (i.e., Ci=5 for all i). Experiments 1 and 
                                                            
2 Collins and Vossler’s experiment is couched in a choice experiment elicitation framework. To make this data 
compatible with the other studies, the cost is taken to be the net benefits associated with the status quo choice or 
“no” vote whereas the value is the net benefits associated with the alternative choice or “yes” vote. 
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2 of the Burton et al. study follow a similar design.3 The other induced-value experiments 
varied both costs and benefits: Vossler and McKee used induced values over the range from 
$1.50 to $9.50, in $1 increments, and costs of $1, $3, $5, $7 and $9; in Burton et al.’s 
induced values in Experiment 3 were $4 and $8 while costs were $3, $5, $7 or $9; for the 
dichotomous choice component of the Collins and Vossler study, induced values range from 
-$1 to $10.50, in $0.50 increments, with associated costs of $2, $3, $4 and $5.   While the 
underlying experimental designs vary across the four studies, a common feature is that each 
can be represented in terms of the distribution of “No” responses as a function of induced 
personal value minus personal costs (i.e., Vi − Ci).   
The Vi − Ci cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for the five groups of 
experiments are presented in Figure 1.4 If the referendum mechanism is perfectly demand 
revealing, we expect 100 percent ‘yes’ votes for negative difference values and zero percent 
‘yes’ votes for positive difference values. In other words there would be single step from 
100 to 0 percent at Vi − Ci = 0.  It is evident from the graphs that perfect demand revelation 
is not observed in any of the four studies. The four studies combined yield 556 of 603, or 
92.2%, of votes consistent with induced preferences. As a test of demand revelation, we use 
one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests to test the null hypothesis that the empirical 
                                                            
3 Burton et al. conduct three experiments “using two very different participant groups (cadets at a US military 
academy and university students in Northern Ireland” (pps. 518-519), and report finding different behaviors across 
the two groups.  On this basis we group Experiments 1 and 3, conducted using cadets from the US military academy, 
and treat Experiment 2, with the university students from Northern Ireland, separately.  The basic findings reported 
in the text for this grouping hold for the alternate in which each experiment is treated separately.   
4 To obtain a valid CDF we imposed a monotonicity constraint following the approach described by Haab and 
McConnell (1997). 
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and theoretical difference value CDFs are equal.5 This null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% 
level for three of the five data sets, Taylor et al., Burton et al. (Experiment 2) and Collins 
and Vossler.  However, for two of the three studies where K-S tests reject the hypothesis of 
perfect demand revelation the “mis-votes” or digressions from induced-preferences at the 
source of the rejection occur at rather small difference values: for Taylor et al. this is 
between -$0.10 and $0.50; for Vossler and McKee this is between $0 and $0.50. As Taylor 
et al. argue, it may be that “rewards and penalties of less than $1 may not have been salient” 
(p. 65).  Similarly, along the line of thought underlying random utility modeling, the 
assumption that utility is driven by induced values may only capture the true underlying 
utility comparison with some degree of unobservable error.  For example, social preferences 
may play a role.  Models relying only on induced values do not capture possible altruism or 
alternative forms of other-regarding preferences participants may have.  We do not, 
however, believe that these arguments carry over to the level of “mis-votes” observed in the 
Burton et al. Experiment 2 for more  salient difference values of -$2 and $2.  For the 
moment at least, this Experiment appears to be an unexplained outlier, in which behavior for 
this group of students seems differs considerably and significantly from the economic 
predictions as well as from the results of the body of experiments in this area. 
We further note that although there are some systematic differences between 
empirical and theoretical difference-value distributions, this does not necessarily translate 
into biased willingness to pay (WTP) distributions. That is, it may be the case that at a 
                                                            
5 The D-statistic corresponding with the K-S goodness of fit test is the absolute value of the maximum difference 
between the theoretical and empirical distributions. For a large sample, the critical value for this test associated with 
a 5 percent significance level is approximately n.361 , where n is the sample size of the empirical distribution.  
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particular cost amount that ‘yes’ and ‘no’ ”mis-votes” cancel each other out to a large 
degree. We turn to an analysis of “aggregate” demand revelation below. 
In a similar fashion to our analysis of difference values, we compare empirical and 
theoretical WTP CDFs using K-S tests for the Vossler and McKee and the Collins and 
Vossler studies6,7. To be clear, these CDFs are constructed from the proportion of “no” 
responses to each cost amount, rather than the proportion of “no” responses to each 
difference value. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality between empirical and 
theoretical WTP distributions in both studies.  
Taken together, we interpret the results from the above tests as indicative that 
decisions are consistent with aggregate demand revelation, but there are some deviations 
from induced preferences at particular dollar values. Most of the deviations from induced 
preferences occur for small differences between induced value and cost. As mentioned 
above, uncontrolled social preferences may explain at least some of these decisions.  
 
Demand Revelation in Binary Referendum with Uncertainty in Values 
                                                            
6 An alternative to the approach used in the text would be to estimate mean and median values for the difference 
distributions presented in Figures 1 and 2, and to compare these estimates to the theoretical prediction that the mean 
and median values of the Vi-Ci distribution are equal to zero.  Rejection of this test would suggest that errors are 
systematic in one direction relative to Vi-Ci = 0. We do not adopt this approach here because the validity of the test 
would rest on the assumption that the Vi and Ci are not correlated.  Based on our personal knowledge of the Vossler 
and McKee study, this is not the case.  In the Vossler and McKee study the Vi and Ci. values were deliberately 
correlated.  Personal communication with Mike McKee indicates that the Vi to Ci relationship in the Taylor et al. 
study was specifically structured so that it was unlikely that the referenda would pass, thus facilitating more rapid 
payouts in classroom experiments.  
7 The Taylor et al.  and Experiments 1 and 2 of Burton et al. have a single costs.  The values and costs of the third 
experiment in Burton et al. had value to cost relationships that were, for some costs only one-sided, not allowing for 
a two sided error distribution.  For these reasons we judged that the data from these studies was not amenable to 
estimating willingness-to-pay distributions. 
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To this point, our discussion has only reported results from demand revelation studies in which 
the induced values are certain.  It has, however, long been recognized (e.g. Opaluch and 
Segerson, 1989;  Dubourg et al., 1994; Ready et al., 1995) that rather than having a single point 
estimate of the value for the environmental or public good, contingent valuation respondents may 
instead have a distribution or range of possible WTP values.  To explore the effect of uncertainty 
on demand revelation of the binary referendum mechanism, Vossler and McKee built upon their 
previously discussed experimental design by inducing uncertainty in values as follows: 
“For value certainty treatments, induced values across group members are uniformly 
distributed over the range of $1.50 to $9.50, in $1 increments.  For uncertain value 
treatments, participants are given a $2 range of possible values.  These ranges are 
constructed by adding/subtracting $1 from the set of certain values.  This range is wide 
relative to the value distribution.  Participants are instructed that each value in the range 
(in 25-cent increments) has an equal chance of being selected.  After all the [voting] 
decisions are made, the exact value for each participant is determined through a die 
roll” (p. 142). 
 
Under the assumption that individuals are expected utility maximizers that base their voting  
decisions on the expected difference value, E[Vi − Ci] = E[Vi] – Ci , Figure 2 plots the 
distribution of “No” responses across expected induced difference values using the methods 
described above.  Using a K-S test, we reject the null hypothesis of equal empirical and 
theoretical difference-value functions at the 5% level. Note, however, that this rejection is 
driven by votes made under expected differences of -$0.50 and $0.50, both of which lie 
within the range of induced uncertainty.  Arguably, if respondents invoke decision heuristics 
other than expected value maximization, it is not valid to assume that these represent errors.  
The null hypothesis of equality between the theoretical and empirical distributions cannot be 
rejected when differences from -$0.50 to $0.50 are excluded.  Similar to the above results 
with certain values, we do not find any bias between the theoretical and empirical WTP 
functions. While the evidence regarding uncertain induced values is limited to one study, 
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these results are consistent with the notion that the demand revelation characteristics of the 
incentive-compatible consequential binary referendum carry over to cases for which induced 
values are uncertain. 
 
Framed Field Experiments: Homegrown Values and Consequentiality 
While induced-value laboratory experiments provide critical information about the demand 
revelation characteristics of consequential, incentive-compatible value elicitation mechanisms 
for public goods, contingent valuation is inherently a field method to elicit “homegrown values” 
that an individual might have for a nonmarket environmental or public good.  “Homegrown 
value”,  
“refers to a subject’s value that is independent of the value which an experimenter 
might ‘induce’ (see Vernon L. Smith, 1976). The idea is that homegrown values are 
those that the subject brings to an experiment” (Cummings et al., p. 260) 
 
Researchers have used framed field experiments, which differ from a conventional 
laboratory experiment in a number of ways, to further explore consequentiality.  As defined 
by Harrison and List (2004) laboratory experiments conventionally use a standard 
participant pool of students, frame the decision abstractly and impose a set of rules.  A 
framed field experiment instead uses a non-standard participant pool with a “field context in 
either the commodity, task, or information set that the subjects can use” (Harrison and List 
(2004), p. 1014). 
Landry and List (2007) and Carson et al. (2004) undertake a series of framed field 
experiments using participants from a well functioning marketplace – the floor of a sports 
card show in Tucson, Arizona.  Participants were recruited as they entered the show for a 
public goods experiment run in a separate room in the same building.  The public good is the 
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provision of n identical pieces of sports memorabilia if the majority of n participant votes to 
fund “Mr. Twister.”  An excerpt from Landry and List describes the good. 
“Welcome to Lister’s Referendum. Today you have the opportunity to vote on whether 
‘Mr. Twister,’ this small metal box, will be ‘funded.’ If ‘Mr. Twister’ is funded, I will 
turn the handle and n (the amount of people in the room) ticket stubs dated October 12, 
1997, which were issued for the game in which Barry Sanders passed Jim Brown for the 
number 2 spot in the NFL all-time rushing yardage, will be distributed—one to each 
participant (illustrate). To fund ‘Mr. Twister,’ all of you will have to pay $X.” (p. 423) 
 
The $X values were $5 and $10 in Landry and List. In the Carson et al. (2004) study, “Mr. 
Twister” distributed Kansas City Royal game ticket stubs dated June 14 1996, which were issued 
for admission to the baseball game in which Cal Ripken Jr. broke the world record for 
consecutive games played.  The cost to each individual of funding “Mr. Twister” was $10. 
 We report on three treatments here.  First, in what we label as the “baseline” treatment 
the ticket stubs were provided and everyone paid the indicated costs if the majority of the 
participants voted to fund “Mr. Twister”.  If 50% or less of the participants voted to fund “Mr. 
Twister”, no one paid the fee and no one received a ticket stub.  The “probabilistic referenda” 
was the same as the baseline treatment, with the following exception. If the majority voted to 
fund “Mr. Twister”, then a second step, a coin flip, would be used to determine if the funding 
decisions would be binding.  The funding decision was binding if the coin flip turned up heads, a 
50% probability.  To impose other probabilities, a 10-sided die was used in Carson et al.(2004).  
If, for example, a 20% chance was being used, and the die turned up one or two, the ticket stubs 
would be provided and all participants would have to pay the specified amount.  If the die turned 
up a value between three and 10, “Mr Twister” would not be funded.  In the “hypothetical” 
treatment, “passive language was used so that subjects understood that their vote would not 
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induce true economic consequences – i.e. no money would change hands” (Landry and List, p. 
423).    
 Referring back to the consequential/inconsequential definitions, and Proposition 1 above, 
the baseline treatment and the probabilistic referenda satisfy the conditions for an incentive-
compatible elicitation mechanism.   However, in contrast with the induced-value laboratory 
experiments it is not possible to test for demand revelation by comparing induced-value and cost 
distributions. Instead, with homegrown-value criterion validity studies, a common approach is to 
use results from an incentive-compatible elicitation as a benchmark from which to compare 
treatments intended to more closely capture the contingent valuation setting. As a result, the 
relevant null hypothesis here is simply that each of the probabilistic treatments results in vote 
proportions that are equal to those in the baseline, binding referenda. In contrast, the hypothetical 
treatment is inconsequential and hence, we are unable to formulate economic-theoretic 
expectations of voting patterns vis-à-vis the baseline and probabilistic referenda. 
 Selected relevant results from these two studies are reported in Table 1. Examination of 
the Table suggests that there is little difference in the voting behavior between the baseline 
treatment and the probabilistic referenda.  However, the proportion of ’yes’ votes in the 
hypothetical treatment is considerably higher than the consequential treatments.  Statistical tests 
of the hypotheses confirm that the distribution of voting decisions is equal amongst the 
consequential treatments, i.e. the null hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected.  However, the 
equality of the voting behavior between the consequential and inconsequential (i.e., hypothetical) 
treatments can be rejected. Interestingly, the difference in distributions appears to be “knife 
edged”: even low-probability referenda provide similar values as the baseline treatments. 
 The lesson from these data is best summarized by Landry and List:  
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“…we find experimental evidence that suggests responses in hypothetical referenda are 
significantly different from responses in real referenda. This result is in accordance with 
many of the studies that have examined hypothetical and real statements of value. Yet, 
we do find evidence that when decisions potentially have financial consequences, 
subjects behave in a fashion that is consistent with behavior when they have 
consequences with certainty. Our results furthermore suggest that estimates of the lower 
bound of mean WTP derived from “consequential” referenda are statistically 
indistinguishable from estimates of the actual lower bound of WTP.” (p. 427)  
 
Advisory Referenda  
The framed field test experiments support the hypothesis that as long as decisions can 
probabilistically influence an outcome, individuals have incentives to respond as if the referenda 
were binding.  This notion of probabilistic referenda, however, deviates from the situation 
presented in most contingent valuation studies.  Rather, “cover letters for SP studies often state 
that the survey results will be shared with state or local officials….Survey instruments generally 
provide additional signals that respondents should take seriously the valuation exercise” (Vossler 
and Evans, forth.).  In this manner, the aspect of potential consequentiality is stressed, but not 
probabilistically.  Rather, the survey responses are presented as being advisory to decision 
makers.  That such efforts by survey researchers are effective is evidenced in a recent contingent 
valuation study of willingness to vote in favor of a referendum to improve water quality at an 
Iowa lake by Herriges et al. (forth.).  This survey included a Likert-scale question to measure the 
respondents’ belief about the likelihood that survey results would affect policies related to water 
quality in Iowa lakes.  A “one” response indicated “no effect at all” and a “five” response 
denoted “definite” effects.  Less than 7 percent of those returning a survey reported a value of 
one, suggested that only a small proportion of respondents regarded the survey as being 
inconsequential.  
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Carson et al. (2004) address this advisory nature of contingent valuation research in a 
separate proposition:  
“Proposition 2: changing from a binding referendum to an advisory referendum 
doesn’t alter the incentive structure as long as the decision maker is more likely to 
undertake the referendum proposed outcome if the specified plurality favors it. This 
proposition follows from noting that it is the nature of the influence on the decision (the 
agent is potentially pivotal at one point in the decision space, the requisite plurality, 
with only a binary weight on the in the aggregation rule) not the binding nature of the 
referendum that matters.” 
 
In general, incentive compatibility in the advisory referendum will be based on the respondents’ 
perceived influence on the outcome.   
 In a homegrown value laboratory experiment, Vossler and Evans used a split sample 
design to compare responses to binding, advisory and hypothetical referenda.  Student 
participants were asked to vote in a referendum on whether everyone in the group (session) 
would fund the provision and administration of one on-campus, classroom recycling container at 
a particular cost.  Consistent with Proposition 1(a), the funding mechanism was coercive.  In 
addition, there was no clear venue for which students themselves can purchase recycling 
containers (and have them maintained by the university), such that the binding and advisory 
referenda are likely to also satisfy Proposition 1(b).  
 The binding referendum, as in the prior studies, serves as a baseline for comparison. It 
involved a referendum with majority-vote implementation rule, which has already been noted to 
be incentive compatible and demonstrated to be demand revealing in induced-value experiments.  
In the advisory referendum, which Vossler and Evens refer to as an “implicit advisory 
referendum”,  efforts were made to make the instructions as close as possible to a field 
contingent valuation survey in which there is no direct signal on exactly how responses will be 
used in a policy decision.  In this treatment, participants were given the following information. 
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“Passage of the referendum will not solely be determined by how you and the other 
participants vote.  In particular, we, the experiment coordinators, will use your votes as 
advice on whether or not to pass the referendum.  While you will not be told how we 
came to a decision, know that the likelihood the referendum is passed increases with the 
number of YES votes cast.” (Vossler and Evans, forth.) 
 
In actuality, unknown to the participants, the decision rule used was identical to the baseline, i.e. 
a majority-rule vote with no experiment coordinator votes.  The hypothetical treatment framed a 
referendum similar to the baseline, but with slightly different language to make clear that the 
vote was inconsequential. 
 The results of the three treatments are provided in Figure 3, which depict the probability 
of a ‘yes’ response for costs of $1,$3,$6 and $8.  As depicted, the distribution of votes in the 
hypothetical treatment lies to the right of the other two treatments.  Using two-sample K-S tests, 
the null hypothesis of equal WTP distributions is marginally rejected between the hypothetical 
and baseline treatment (D=0.231, p < 0.10) and between the hypothetical advisory vote 
(D=0.231, p < 0.10). The null hypothesis of equality between the baseline and the advisory 
distributions cannot be rejected (D=0.104, p > 0.10).8  These results are only suggestive 
however, as with homegrown values there is no guarantee that the underlying true WTP 
distribution is the same across treatments. Using parametric models that account for whether the 
student has a class in the building designated as the location of the proposed recycling container, 
and socio-economic variables, the authors find that elicited WTP in the hypothetical referendum 
is statistically different, and is roughly 100% higher, than in the baseline. Yet there is no 
statistical difference in elicited WTP between baseline and advisory referenda. 
 Based on their statistical analyses, Vossler and Evans conclude that the results of their 
experiments “designed to capture key characteristics of a SP survey for a proposed 
                                                            
8 In their paper, Vossler and Evans test whether the overall proportion of ‘yes’ responses are equal across treatments 
using Fisher exact tests, which yields stronger evidence of hypothetical bias. 
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environmental program, provide support for the theoretical predictions regarding voter behavior 
in advisory referenda.” This conclusion is further supported in the Herriges et al. comparison of 
the estimated WTP distributions of respondents who indicated that the Iowa lake survey was 
inconsequential and respondents who indicted otherwise. 
“we find support for the equality of WTP distributions among those believing the 
survey is at least minimally consequential, while those believing the survey will have no 
effect on policy have statistically different distributions associated with WTP”  
(Herriges et al., forth.). 
 
These results are consistent with the “Mr Twister” framed field experiments. 
 
A Contingent Valuation Criterion Validity Test 
The last empirical piece of evidence in support of the Carson and Grove’s et al.’s theory of 
consequentiality is a contingent valuation criterion validity test conducted by Johnston (2006). 
This study compares: 
“… genuine discrete choice CV responses to aggregated votes in a subsequent, binding 
public referendum. The assessment is designed to be unambiguous and simple. 
hypothetical and actual choice contexts are parallel and consequential, and address the 
provision of an identical quasi-public good (i.e., the provision of public water to the 
Village of North Scituate, Rhode Island). Respondents are drawn from the same well-
defined population. No re-coding or transformation of survey responses is required, no 
cheap-talk or certainty adjustments are applied, and a ‘‘one vote per survey’’ format 
eliminates the need to adjust for correlation or sequence effects among responses.” (p. 
470) 
 
The contingent valuation study was conducted to assist the Village committee assess the 
public support for a public water provision project.  The intent was to use survey methods to 
determine if there should be an officially sanctioned referendum on the project, as required 
by the State of Rhode Island. Sanctioning, promoting, scheduling and implementation a 
referenda incurs significant costs.  Johnston continues: 
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“Although the survey instrument noted the possibility of a public vote as a possible 
subsequent step in the process of establishing the water supply project, this was the first 
indication that any official referendum might be forthcoming. As the survey was 
designed as a means to assess public preferences—before the official vote was approved 
or scheduled—it provides a nearly ideal context in which to assess the validity of 
hypothetical survey responses in a genuine CV context.” (p. 472). 
 
Based on the contingent valuation study, the village decided to pursue a real referendum, 
wherein the quarterly cost per household was estimated to be $250. 
The results from this comparison of an advisory contingent valuation survey and a 
real vote are consistent with the previously discussed laboratory and field experiments.  As 
depicted in Figure 4, the contingent valuation response distribution across a number of 
possible costs closely predicts the actual proportion of “Yes” responses to $250 in the real 
referendum.  The null hypothesis of equality between the contingent valuation (48.4%) and 
the actual (45.7%) ‘yes’ vote percentage at $250 can not be rejected (p=0.69).  As in Vossler 
and Evans, these results are further supported by parametric estimations of the contingent 
valuation WTP distribution. 
 
Discussion 
With few exceptions, conclusions from past criterion validity studies cast contingent 
valuation in a much different light than studies that focus on other aspects of validity. First, there 
is strong evidence of construct validity: consistent with consumer demand theory, elicited 
contingent values vary with factors such as income and scope, and elicited willingness to accept 
exceeds WTP (see Carson, 1997; Carson et al., 2001). Second, there is strong evidence of 
convergent validity: estimates of value from contingent valuation studies approximate those from 
revealed preference studies (see Carson et al., 1996). This suggests that, at least for eliciting use 
values, contingent valuation may be appropriate. Third, there are persistent elicitation effects 
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demonstrating that, consistent with expectations from mechanism design theory, the mechanism 
used to elicit contingent values matters. In particular open-ended elicitation questions lead to 
lower estimates of value than doe’s dichotomous choice (e.g., Cameron et al., 2002). These 
elicitation effects provide further evidence of construct validity.  
 So then, why is there a divergent conclusion from the majority of criterion validity 
studies? We hypothesize that reliance on using a purely inconsequential decision setting as 
the analog to a stated preference survey is at least a partial explanation. Based on the results 
from the studies highlighted in this chapter, if survey respondents perceive their decisions to 
be consequential, then this motivates responses that are quite different from those in 
inconsequential settings. As such, placing the results of criterion validity studies in their 
proper context of consequentiality can help reduce misinterpretations. On a related note, 
criterion validity studies that compare consequential surveys with actual behavior need also 
cast results in their proper context by drawing on the foundations put forth by Carson and 
Groves, et al. In many cases, for example, these studies compare voluntary contributions 
with consequential surveys cast in a similar context (e.g., Champ et al., 1997). In such a 
framing Proposition 1(b) is likely violated and hence, as argued by Carson and Groves, 
those in the contingent setting should overstate their value if they believe doing so will 
increase the chance of an actual fundraising campaign being implemented. On the other 
hand, as shown in Poe et al. (2002) the voluntary nature of the actual contributions in such 
comparisons will engender free riding, further muddying any efforts to compare actual 
contributions and purely inconsequential survey responses. Rather than providing a test of 
criterion validity, the observed deviation in response patterns, if they are consistent with 
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mechanism design theory, may be construed as empirical evidence of construct validity 
rather than as evidence that contingent valuation lacks criterion validity.         
 Our discussion is not meant to imply that we should reject the accumulated, sizable 
literature that explores hypothetical bias. As suggested by the Herriges et al. study, where there 
was a history of similar surveys affecting public policy, not all respondents indicated that they 
perceived the survey to be consequential. In other settings, such as one where respondents would 
question the ability of the authority to coercively collect payment, perceive that the agency 
would place zero weight on public opinion, or for what appears to be a purely academic study, 
there are likely to be a much higher proportion of respondents for which consequentiality does 
not hold.  
Assuming there is a suitable way to separate respondents into consequential and 
inconsequential camps, researchers are still charged with the task of uncovering the demand of 
those in the latter group. Cheap talk scripts, alternative elicitation formats and/or calibration 
methods will continue to be essential in this regard. Justification for continued reliance on these 
approaches include minimizing possible sample selection bias that may otherwise arise, as well 
as the maximizing the number of useful surveys collected for a given budget.  
We further note that there may be a connection between consequentiality and various 
aspects of survey design, including the use of cheap talk and language in cover letters. For 
instance, cheap talk scripts serve to emphasize the importance of obtaining accurate signals of 
value, and may hence increase the proportion in the consequential camp. On a related note, 
consequentiality may confound split-sample field survey comparisons if there is uncontrolled 
correlation between treatment and consequentiality. As such, this is yet one more reason why the 
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development and use of questions to elicit perceptions about consequentiality remain an 
important area of research.  
From the scant number of methodological studies that are grounded in mechanism design 
theory, it is clear that there is an abundance of additional, fundamental research questions that 
remain. First, with the exception of Johnston, past research on consequentiality has been 
comprised of very controlled studies with attributes that differ from the field survey 
environment, making further field research a priority.  Within the laboratory setting the 
experimental design may be modified to invoke closer correspondence with the field survey 
setting. Further, given that many researchers, usually out of concern for statistical efficiency or 
scenario plausibility, continue to use alternatives to the referendum elicitation format, sometimes 
with a voluntary contributions payment vehicle, exploration of these formats in controlled but 
consequential decision settings is warranted. 
  On a final note, there is a very pragmatic reason for redefining criterion validity in terms 
of consequentiality: we, as stated preference researchers, have been our own worst enemy in the 
debate over the criterion validity of contingent values. Stated preference researchers who cast 
surveys as purely inconsequential exercises are providing the impetus to other economists, 
academics and policy makers to dismiss results from our work. By grounding our work in 
mechanism design theory we, like many other economists, would have theoretical justification 
for what we do as well as a framework from which to undertake empirical tests.  Pursuing this 
path will no doubt lead to theoretical refinements that will not only inform stated preference 
research, but more broadly the economics profession in areas such as decision making under 
uncertainty and voting. Further, shifting to the consequentiality paradigm should serve to 
increase the demand for stated preference research in the private and public sectors. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of “No” Respondents, Expected Difference Value, Vossler and McKee 
(2006) 
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Figure 3: Real, Advisory and Hypothetical Voting Distributions, Vossler and Evans (forth.) 
 
Figure 4: Contingent Valuation and Real Referendum Comparison, Johnson (2006) 
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Table 1: Field Tests of Consequentiality: Percent “Yes” (number of observations) 
 
Description 
Consequential Inconsequential
 
Real 
Probabilistic % Chance of Being Binding Hypothetical 
0.80 0.50 0.20 
Landry and 
List (2007), 
$5 
33 
(64) 
n.a. 32 
(59) 
n.a. 84 
(64) 
Landry and 
List (2007), 
$10 
19 
(64) 
n.a. 20 
(59) 
n.a. 75 
(64) 
Carson et al. 
(2004), $10 
46 
(96) 
41 
(46) 
48 
(52) 
44 
(50) 
60 
(58) 
  24
References 
Aadland, D., B. Anatchkova, B. Grandjean, J.F. Shogren, B. Simon and P.A. Taylor (2007), 
“Valuing Access to Our Public Lands: A Unique Public Good Pricing Experiment”, Selected 
Paper Presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association meetings, Portland 
OR, July. 
Bohm, P. (1972), “Estimating Demands for Public Goods: An Experiment”, European Economic 
Review, 3: 111-130. 
Burton, A.C., K.S. Carson, S.M. Chilton and W.G. Hutchinson (2007), “Resolving Questions 
about Bias in Real and Hypothetical Referenda”, Environmental and Resource Economics 
38(4): 513-525. 
Cameron, T.A., G.L. Poe, R.G. Ethier and W.D. Schulze (2002), “Alternative Non-Market 
Value-Elicitation Methods: Are the Underlying Preferences the Same?”, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 44: 391-425. 
Carson, R.T. (1997), “Contingent Valuation Surveys and Tests of Insensitivity to Scope”, In R.J. 
Kopp, W. Pommerhene and N. Schwartz, eds., Determining the Value of Non-Marketed 
Goods: Economic, Psychological, and Policy Relevant Aspects of Contingent Valuation 
Methods. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 127–163. 
Carson, R.T., N.E. Flores, K.M. Martin and J.L. Wright (1996), “Contingent Valuation and 
Revealed Preference Methodologies: Comparing the Estimates for Quasi-Public Goods”, 
Land Economics 72(1): 80–99. 
Carson, R.T., N.E. Flores and N.F. Meade (2001), "Contingent Valuation: Controversies and 
Evidence", Environmental and Resource Economics 19(2): 173-210. 
Carson R.T., T. Groves and M.J. Machina (1997), “Stated preference questions: context and 
optimal response.” Paper presented at the National science foundation preference elicitation 
symposium, University of California, Berkeley. 
Carson R.T., T. Groves and M.J. Machina (1999), “Incentive and Informational Properties of 
Preferences Questions”, Plenary Address, European Association of Environmental and 
Resource Economists, Oslo, Norway. 
Carson, R.T and T. Groves (2007), “Incentive and Informational Properties of Preference 
Questions”, Environmental and Resource Economics 37(1): 181-210. 
Carson, R., T. Groves, J. List and M. Machina (2004), “Probabilistic Influence and Supplemental 
Benefits: A Field Test of Two Key Assumptions Underlying Stated Preferences”, 
Unpublished Draft Manuscript. 
Champ, P.A., RC. Bishop, T.C. Brown and D.W. McCollum (1997), “Using Donation 
Mechanisms to Value Non-Use Benefits form Public Goods”, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 33(2): 151-163. 
Collins, J.P. and C.A. Vossler (2009), “Incentive Compatibility Tests of Choice Experiment 
Value Elicitation Questions”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58(2): 
226-235. 
Cummings, R.G., G.W. Harrison and E.E. Ruström (1995), “Homegrown Values and 
Hypothetical Surveys: Is the Dichotomous Choice Approach Incentive Compatible?”, 
American Economic Review 85(1): 260-266. 
DuBourg, W.R., M.W. Jones-Lee and G. Loomes (1994),  “Imprecise Preferences and the WTP-
WTA Disparity”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 9: 115-133. 
  25
Gibbard, A. (1973), “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result”, Econometrica 41(3): 
587-602. 
Haab, T.C. and K.E. McConell (1997), “Referendum Models and Negative Willingness to Pay: 
Alternative Solutions”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 32(2): 251-
270. 
Harrison, G.W. and J.A. List (2004), “Field Experiments”, Journal of Economic Literature 
XLII: 1009-1055. 
Harrison, G.W. and E. Ruström (2008), “Chapter 81: Experimental Evidence on the Existence of 
Hypothetical Bias in Value Elicitation Methods”, Handbook of Experimental Economics 1: 
752-767.  
Herriges, J., C. Kling, C-C Liu, and J. Tobias (forth.), “What are the Consequences of 
Consequentiality?”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 
Johnston, R.J. (2006), “Is Hypothetical Bias Universal? Validating Contingent Valuation 
Responses Using a Binding Public Referendum”, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 52(1):469-481. 
Kahneman, D., P. Slovic and A. Tversky (1982), Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and 
biases. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Kriström, B. (1990), “A Non-Parametric Approach to the Estimation of Welfare Measures in 
Discrete Response Valuation Studies”, Land Economics 66(2): 135-139. 
Kuhn, T.S. (1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd Ed., Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Landry, C.E. and J.A. List (2007), “Using Ex Ante Approaches to Obtain Credible Signals for 
Value in Contingent Markets: Evidence from the Field”, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 89(2): 420-429. 
List, J.A. and C.A. Gallet (2001), “What Experiential Protocol Influence Disparities Between 
Actual and Hypothetical Stated Values: Evidence from a Meta Analysis”, Environmental 
and Resource Economics 20(3): 251-254. 
Little, J. and R. Berrens (2004), “Explaining Disparities Between Actual and Hypothetical Stated 
Values: Further Investigations Using Meta Analysis”, Economics Bulletin 3(6): 1-13. 
Murphy, J.J., P.G. Allen, T.H. Stevens, and D. Weatherhead  (2005), “A Meta-Analysis of 
Hypothetical Bias in Stated Preference Valuation”, Environmental and Resource Economics  
30(3): 313-325. 
Murphy, J.J. and T.H. Stevens (2004), “Contingent Valuation, Hypothetical Bias, and 
Experimental Economics”, Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 33(2): 182-192. 
Opaluch, J.J. and K. Segerson (1989), “Rational Roots of ‘Irrational’ Behavior: New Theories of 
Economic Decision-Making”, Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics Review 18(2): 81-95. 
Poe, G.L. J.E. Clark, D. Rondeau and W.D. Schulze (2002), “Provision Point Mechanisms and 
Field Validity Tests of Contingent Valuation”, Environmental and Resource Economics 
23(1): 105-131. 
Ready, R.C., J.C. Whitehead and G.C. Blomquist (1995), “Contingent Valuation When 
Respondents are Ambivalent”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
29(2): 181-186. 
Satterthwaite, M. (1975), “Strategy-Proofness and Arrow Conditions: Existence and 
Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Welfare Functions”, Journal of 
Economic Theory 10(2): 187-217. 
  26
Smith, V.L. (1976), “Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory”, American Economic 
Review, 66(2): 274-279. 
Taylor, L.O., M. McKee, S.K. Laury and R.G. Cummings (2001), “Induced-Value Tests of the 
Referendum Voting Mechanism”,  Economics Letters 71: 61-65. 
Vaughan, W.J. and D.J. Rodriguez (2001), “Obtaining Welfare Bounds in Discrete-Response 
Valuation Studies: Comment”, Land Economics 77(3): 457-465. 
Vossler, C.A. and M. McKee (2006), “Induced Value Tests of Contingent Valuation Elicitation 
Mechanisms”, Environmental and Resource Economics 35: 137-168. 
Vossler, C.A. and M.F. Evans (forth.), “Bridging the Gap Between the Field and the Lab: 
Environmental Goods, Policy Maker Input, and Consequentiality”, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management. 
